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Abstract  
We welcome the critical appraisal of the database used by the behavioral sciences, but 
we suggest that the authors’ differentiation between variable and universal features is 
ill conceived and that their categorization of non-WEIRD populations is misleading. 
We propose a different approach to comparative research, which takes population 
variability seriously and recognizes the methodological difficulties it engenders.  
Main Text 
The authors of the target article call for an ambitious reorganization of the behavioral 
sciences, motivated by two key observations: that the populations on which behavioral 
scientists typically base their findings are outliers from the rest of human kind; that there 
is significant population variability, which complicates the identification of those 
behavioral and psychological features that are universal. We start by appraising each of 
these observations (in reverse order) and we conclude by proposing a different approach 
to comparative research. 
 
1. Population variability. The existence of significant population variability is 
convincingly documented by the authors, who find it as soon as they look beyond the 
ridiculously narrow samples on which claims of universality have typically been based. 
While in agreement with the finding, we have a problem with the authors’ underlying 
assumption. This is the idea that it is possible to neatly sort variable features of human 
behavior and psychology from universal ones. As anthropologists, we have no problem in 
accepting that cultural, historical and environmental contexts affect all the features 
discussed in the article, but this observation has no bearing on the question of whether 
such features are “universal” or “variable.” It is the variable/universal dichotomy itself 
(and the questions it generates) that is misleading. This is because human beings are 
affected simultaneously by processes of a different nature, among them phylogeny, 
history, in its social and cultural instantiations, and ontogeny. But none of these processes 
is ever active in isolation, making it impossible to track its universal or variable effects. 
Searching in any human phenomenon for the clear signature of one of these processes in 
isolation is a wild goose chase.  
  
2. WEIRD as outliers. The authors use three broad population contrasts in order to zoom 
in on the weirdness of the subject population used to generalize about human nature. The 
point is well taken, as is the call for more research among non-WEIRD populations. In 
their eagerness to condemn the reliance on WEIRD subjects, however, the authors end up 
presenting and conceptualizing population variability in terms of extremely dubious 
categories. Curiously, while they feel the need to clarify what they mean by the term 
“Western” and to acknowledge its limitations, they offer no apology for using “small 
scale societies” as if the term referred to a unified, meaningful whole (a similar point 
could be made for “non-Westerner” or “East Asian”). This uncritical lumping together of 
a variety of disparate societies is particularly odd in a paper that denounces unsound 
generalizations. As clearly demonstrated by the results of the economic games, some 
“small scale societies” can vary just as much among themselves as they do from the 
WEIRD population – a fact that should not be surprising given that “small scale 
societies” are as caught up in the flow of human history as any other. One could argue 
that the extreme weirdness of the WEIRD population is partly the result of having 
lumped together other populations under too simplistic and under theorized labels. 
 
3. Our proposal. As anthropologists committed to the study of human nature (Bloch 
2005), we welcome the authors’ critical appraisal of the behavioral sciences’ comparative 
database. We feel, nonetheless, that the authors have not sufficiently taken to heart the 
fundamental implications of their analysis. One obvious conclusion they might have 
drawn is that behavioral scientists should pay more attention to the work of 
cultural/social anthropologists, since these are the scientists who have made human 
variability their main focus. It is striking, however, how little reference they make to 
anthropological research. This, of course, is no accident. It has to do with the kind of data 
that anthropologists have produced, which in turn has to do with the history of their 
discipline. At the start, anthropologists went to the field with ready made questions that 
were generated by a simplistic, yet highly influential, evolutionary theory, which is still 
the basis of popular understandings of the difference between “civilized” and “primitive” 
societies (sometimes euphemistically called “small scale”). But such outmoded theory 
had to be abandoned because, it was soon realized, human history does not proceed along 
a progressive and unilineal path. Because of the human capacity for culture, each human 
society is the unique product of a unique, albeit not isolated, history. Ever since the 
recognition of this fact, anthropologists have faced a difficult methodological difficulty: 
questions formulated from within one historical context produce misleading answers 
when transposed elsewhere as they appear weird, uninterpretable, or mean something else 
(arguably, this is what generates the weirdness of the WEIRD population, since what 
distinguishes it from all the others is that it is the one that generates the questions). The 
way anthropologists have tried to overcome this challenge has been to abandon, initially 
at least, all questions formulated outside the context under their investigation. Rather, 
through participant observation, they have allowed themselves to discover, from the 
inside, the terms and values of the people they study. This strategy is not without 
difficulties, since it generates a kind of data that appears impressionistic and anecdotal 
and which, crucially, precludes comparison and generalization – which is why it is so 
often ignored by other behavioral scientists, such as the authors of the target article. We 
recognize that this is a very serious limitation, but we insist that behavioral scientists 
must acknowledge and never underestimate the equally serious and unavoidable problem 
that led anthropologists down this methodological route in the first place. Therefore, the 
solution cannot be, as suggested by the authors, to administer studies upon studies to the 
billions of (poor) people around the world who remain untapped by the behavioral 
sciences. The solution is far more complicated and costly. It requires an often 
uncomfortable compromise between internal validity and generality, and a lot more 
detailed ethnographic work than many seem to be willing to accept (see e.g. Astuti, 
Solomon & Carey 2004, Astuti & Harris 2008). Only in this way will data from non 
WEIRD populations become a meaningful and indispensable ingredient of any general 
theory about our species. 
 
Astuti, R., Solomon, G. E. A. & Carey, S. (2004). Constraints on conceptual development: A 
case study of the acquisition of folkbiological and folksociological knowledge in 
Madagascar, Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 69, 
Serial no. 277, no.3. 
 
Astuti, R. & Harris, P. L. Harris (2008). Understanding Mortality and the Life of the 
ancestors in Madagascar, Cognitive Science, 32, 713-740. 
 
Bloch, M. (2005). Where did anthropology go? Or the need for ‘human nature’. In M.Bloch 
Essays on Cultural Transmission (pp.1-19). Oxford: Berg.  
